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“MINUTE AND SEPARATE”: CONSIDERING 
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF VIDEOTAPED 
FORENSIC INTERVIEWS IN CHILD SEXUAL 
ABUSE CASES AFTER CRAWFORD AND DAVIS 
Kimberly Y. Chin* 
Abstract: Child sexual abuse is one of the least prosecuted crimes in the 
United States in part because of the many evidentiary challenges prosecu-
tors face. In 2004, the Supreme Court introduced a new standard for de-
termining the admissibility of out-of-court statements made by declarants 
who are unavailable to testify at trial. In Crawford v. Washington, the Su-
preme Court held that testimonial statements are only admissible at trial 
if the declarant is unavailable to testify and there was a prior opportunity 
for cross-examination. This Note will examine Crawford’s impact on the 
admissibility of videotaped forensic interviews with child victims of sexual 
abuse and suggest that courts adopt a “minute and separate” approach 
when deciding whether statements contained in those interviews are tes-
timonial in nature. 
Introduction 
 On June 25, 2002, Von, a six-year-old boy, told his mother that a 
neighborhood boy, Rolandis, had sexually assaulted him.1 Six days later, 
Von’s mother took him to the Carrie Lynn Children’s Center in Rock-
ford, Illinois.2 The Center serves child victims of sexual abuse.3 There, 
a child advocate interviewed Von, and the interview was videotaped ac-
cording to the Center’s protocol.4 During the interview, Von described 
the incident with Rolandis and answered questions posed by the child 
advocate.5 A police officer observed the interview through a one-way 
                                                                                                                      
* Managing Editor, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2009–2010). 
1 See In re Rolandis G., 902 N.E.2d 600, 603–04 (Ill. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2747 
(2009). Von told his mother that “Rolandis made [him] suck his dick.” Id. at 603. He told a 
police officer that “Rolandis had been holding a stick in his hand when he forced [him] to 
perform this act.” Id. at 604. Von also stated that “he had choked while . . . performing the 
act and that a fluid had come out of Rolandis’ penis.” Id. 
2 See id. at 604. 
3 Id. 
4 See id. 
5 See id. 
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mirror, but did not participate.6 When the interview concluded, the 
police officer obtained a copy of the video into custody, placed it in an 
evidence bag, and kept it at the police station.7 
 At trial, Von refused to answer questions about the incident with 
Rolandis.8 Subsequently, the videotape of Von’s interview at the Carrie 
Lynn Children’s Center was entered into evidence under exceptions to 
the hearsay rule.9 The entire videotape was played at trial.10 Rolandis 
was found guilty of aggravated criminal sexual assault.11 In 2008, the 
Supreme Court of Illinois held that the videotaped statements Von 
made during the interview with the child advocate were testimonial 
and as such, their admission at trial violated the Confrontation Clause 
of the Sixth Amendment.12 
* * * 
 On December 7, 2005, Wendy Otto found her husband, Michael 
Arnold, alone with their four-year-old daughter in their bedroom.13 Af-
ter noticing her husband’s boxers were on improperly and discovering 
                                                                                                                      
6 See Rolandis, 902 N.E.2d at 604. 
7 Id. 
8 See id. at 603. 
9 See id. at 605. 
10 Id. at 604. 
11 Rolandis, 902 N.E.2d at 605. 
12 Id. at 619. The court observed: 
[T]he Carrie Lynn Children’s Center, where Von’s interview took place, is 
one of several accredited child advocacy centers in this state “established to 
coordinate the activities of the various agencies involved in the investigation, 
prosecution and treatment referral of child sexual abuse.” . . . [T]he record, 
from an objective viewpoint, indicates that the interview took place at the be-
hest of the police so that a more detailed account of the alleged sexual abuse 
could be obtained by a trained interviewer and memorialized on videotape. 
Moreover, because the interview was witnessed by Detective Swanberg and a 
copy of the videotaped interview immediately turned over to him “as evi-
dence” upon completion of the interview, the objective circumstances indi-
cate that Von’s statement was the product of an interrogation, conducted on 
behalf of the police, intended to gather information and establish past acts 
for future prosecution. 
Id. at 611. Further, the court could not find “[any] indication that, in the case at bar, We-
ber’s interview of Von was conducted, to a substantial degree, for treatment rather than 
investigative purposes.” Id. As a result, it held that “Von’s videotaped statement was testi-
monial in nature and, because Von did not testify at trial and there was no prior opportu-
nity for cross-examination, it was improperly admitted in violation of respondent’s con-
frontation rights.” Id. Although the Supreme Court of Illinois found that the statements 
violated the defendant’s confrontation rights, it also held that the admittance was harmless 
and thus, affirmed Rolandis’s conviction. See id. at 619. 
13 See State v. Arnold, No. 07AP-789, 2008 WL 2698885, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. July 10, 
2008), appeal docketed, 898 N.E.2d 967 (Ohio 2008). 
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her daughter’s underwear around her knees, Wendy told her husband 
to leave the house and proceeded to call 911.14 The four-year-old child 
told a responding firefighter that “someone had touched her in her pri-
vate parts.”15 The following day, Wendy accompanied her daughter to 
the Child and Family Advocacy Center at Children’s Hospital.16 There, a 
licensed social worker questioned the child about the prior day’s events, 
and the interview was videotaped.17 “During the interview, the child ac-
cused [Arnold] of conduct that would constitute sexual abuse.”18 
Among other onlookers, a detective observed the interview from an-
other room through a closed-circuit television, but did not participate.19 
 At trial, the four-year-old child was unavailable to testify.20 Subse-
quently, the trial court admitted the videotaped interview conducted at 
the Child and Family Advocacy Center.21 Arnold was found guilty of 
rape by vaginal intercourse of a person less than thirteen years of age.22 
 Faced with this in the same year that the Illinois Supreme Court 
decided In re Rolandis G., the Court of Appeals of Ohio arrived at the 
opposite conclusion.23 It held that the statements made during the 
videotaped interview were not testimonial and that their admission at 
trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amend-
ment.24 
                                                                                                                      
14 See id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 See id. 
18 Arnold, 2008 WL 2698885, at *1. 
19 See id. 
20 See id. 
21 See id. 
22 See id. 
23 See Arnold, 2008 WL 2698885, at *8 (distinguishing the interview in question from 
those which only serve the purpose to gather evidence instead of medical diagnosis or 
treatment). 
24 See id. The court held: 
[The social worker] acted without police involvement during the interview 
and questioned the child so that the child could be properly treated. . . . The 
primary purpose of [the] interview was to gather information for the child’s 
proper treatment and diagnosis and not to produce evidence for a future 
prosecution, even though such evidence may have been produced as a result 
of the interview. 
Id. Thus, “the child’s statements are not testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation 
Clause [and] [a]ccordingly, the admission of those statements did not violate appellant’s 
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.” Id. The Supreme Court of Ohio has accepted 
appellate review of this case. See State v. Arnold, 898 N.E.2d 967 (Ohio 2008). 
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 These two cases demonstrate the confusion in the lower courts re-
garding the implications of the Confrontation Clause on videotaped 
out-of-court statements made by child victims of sexual abuse.25 In both 
of these cases, videotaped interviews with a trained questioner resulted 
in the child victims making statements describing the abuse and identi-
fying the defendant as the perpetrator.26 That nearly identical facts re-
sulted in completely opposite holdings in different states suggests that 
guidance is necessary in order to resolve this conflict among the lower 
courts.27 
* * * 
 When a witness is unavailable to testify at trial, her out-of-court 
statements are admissible only under specific circumstances.28 In 1980, 
the Supreme Court ruled that the reliability of the out-of-court state-
ments would govern their admissibility at trial.29 But, in 2004, the Su-
preme Court established a new standard for evaluating when these 
statements could be introduced at trial.30 This standard permitted the 
admission of out-of-court testimonial statements only if the witness was 
                                                                                                                      
25 Compare Rolandis, 902 N.E.2d at 619 (holding that admission of videotaped evidence 
violated the defendant’s confrontation right), with Arnold, 2008 WL 2698885, at *8 (hold-
ing that admission of videotaped evidence did not violate the defendant’s confrontation 
right). 
26 Rolandis, 902 N.E.2d at 604; Arnold, 2008 WL 2698885, at *1. 
27 See Robert P. Mosteller, Testing the Testimonial Concept and Exceptions to Confrontation: “A 
Little Child Shall Lead Them,” 82 Ind. L.J. 917, 996 (2007); Richard D. Friedman, Further De-
velopments and Thoughts on Child Witnesses, The Confrontation Blog, http://confront- 
ationright.blogspot.com/2007/10/further-developments-and-thoughts-on.html (Oct. 26, 2007, 
15:29 EST). Professor Mosteller writes: 
 The most unsettled and contentious area involves statements with multiple 
purposes. The critical question for the future is whether videotaped state-
ments that ultimately are used in court as the equivalent of testimony will be 
treated as nontestimonial if they are taken by government officials who are 
not explicitly pursuing a law enforcement purpose. The test case is the state-
ment taken in a nonemergency situation that has as its primary purpose the 
general welfare of the child (such as the child’s placement), and results in a 
videotaped statement which is ultimately offered in evidence at trial describ-
ing abuse and identifying the defendant as the perpetrator. 
Mosteller, supra, at 996. Professor Friedman believes that “the confrontation issues posed 
by statements by children are enormously important, complex, and troubling. Sooner or 
later, the Supreme Court will have to begin resolving many of these issues.” Friedman, 
supra. 
28 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). 
29 See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
30 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
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unavailable to testify at trial and there was a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.31 
 As In re Rolandis G. and State v. Arnold demonstrate, the testimonial 
standard has had a particular impact on child sexual abuse cases, with 
lower courts struggling in its application.32 This Note will discuss the 
impact of the Crawford rule of confrontation on statements made by 
child victims of sexual abuse. Particularly, it will focus on the mixed 
purpose statements made during videotaped interviews of child sexual 
abuse victims with forensic interviewers.33 
 Part I will include a brief history of the Supreme Court’s Confron-
tation Clause jurisprudence with a focus on its application to child sex-
ual abuse cases. Part II will discuss the evidentiary challenges of prose-
cuting child sexual abuse and briefly discuss the implications those 
challenges have on the confrontation rights of the accused. Part III will 
examine how videotaping and forensic interviewing has helped in-
crease the reliability of a child victim’s out-of-court statements, but has 
ultimately created inadmissible testimonial statements under Crawford. 
                                                                                                                      
31 See id. Rule 804 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states: 
“Unavailability as a witness” includes situations in which the declarant— 
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testify-
ing concerning the subject matter of the declarant’s statement; or 
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the decla-
rant’s statement despite an order of the court to do so; or 
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant’s 
statement; or 
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or 
then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or 
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of a statement has been 
unable to procure the declarant’s attendance (or in the case of a hearsay ex-
ception under subdivision (b)(2), (3), or (4), the declarant’s attendance or 
testimony) by process or other reasonable means. 
Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(1)–(5). Child victims of sexual abuse, however, rarely fall into these 
articulated categories; instead, judges often deem them unavailable to testify because of 
issues regarding competency and trauma. See infra Part II.C. 
32See Rolandis, 902 N.E.2d at 613 (“We are not unsympathetic to the State’s concern 
that child abuse victims are often unavailable to testify because of their tender years and, 
for that reason, ‘Crawford is incompatible with the realities of child abuse prosecutions.’”); 
Arnold, 2008 WL 2698885, at *8; Prudence Beidler Carr, Comment, Playing by the Rules: 
How to Define and Provide a “Prior Opportunity for Cross-Examination” in Child Sexual Abuse 
Cases After Crawford v. Washington, 97 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 631, 631 (2007). 
33 These mixed purpose statements may establish past events but are initially provided 
out of the questioner’s concern for the child’s well-being. See Mosteller, supra note 27, at 
970–71. Although the primary purpose for these statements may be for medical treatment, 
“a prosecutorial interest may quickly follow.” Id. at 971. Thus, mixed purpose statements 
that are videotaped “present a major Confrontation Clause issue because the videotape is 
used as evidence at trial.” Id. at 966. 
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Finally, Part IV will suggest that courts should consider statements 
made in these videotaped forensic interviews in minute and separate 
assertions when determining the testimonial nature of a child victim’s 
disclosures in order to preserve the benefits of these statements while 
also honoring the defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights. 
I. A Brief History of the Confrontation Clause and Child 
Sexual Abuse Cases: From Roberts to Crawford 34 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him . . . . 
—the Confrontation Clause35 
A. Ohio v. Roberts: The Reliability Rule 
 Until 2004, the reliability rule established in Ohio v. Roberts gov-
erned the admissibility of out-of-court statements from unavailable wit-
nesses.36 Under this rule, an unavailable witness’s out-of-court statement 
could be admitted at trial if it “[bore] adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’”37 
The Court held that such “reliability can be inferred without more” 
when such statements “fall[] within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” 
or bear “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”38 
 In the decade following Roberts, the Supreme Court applied the 
reliability rule to two child sexual abuse cases.39 In White v. Illinois, the 
Court affirmed that the admission of a child’s out-court-statements un-
der established hearsay exceptions did not violate the Confrontation 
                                                                                                                      
34 This history will only cover cases that address the admissibility of out-of-court state-
ments, focusing particularly on child sexual abuse cases. Cases defining what constitutes 
sufficient confrontation when a child testifies at trial fall outside the scope of this Note and 
will not be directly addressed. For an introduction to what constitutes sufficient confronta-
tion when a child testifies, see Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 859–60 (1990) (holding that 
having a child witness testify by one-way closed-circuit television did not violate the Con-
frontation Clause) and Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016–22 (1988) (addressing the consti-
tutionality of placing a screen between a child witness and the defendant when the child 
testifies and finding that face-to-face cross-examination is not an absolute component of 
confrontation). 
35 U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
36 See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
37 See id. 
38 Id. 
39 See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356–57 (1992); Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 827 
(1990). 
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Clause even though the child did not testify at trial.40 The Court found 
that these statements carried “sufficient guarantees of reliability” be-
cause they “[came] within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay 
rule.”41 Furthermore, the hearsay statements “had substantial probative 
value . . . that could not be duplicated” by live testimony.42 Thus, in 
White, the Supreme Court affirmed the application of the Roberts rule to 
child sexual abuse cases and identified what constituted a “firmly 
rooted hearsay exception” in a child sexual abuse case.43 
 In Idaho v. Wright, the Supreme Court held that the admission of a 
child victim’s out-of-court statements violated the Confrontation Clause 
                                                                                                                      
40 See White, 502 U.S. at 356–57. In White, the petitioner, a friend of the victim’s mother, 
was charged with aggravated criminal sexual assault of a child, who was then four years old. 
Id. at 349. The child described the assault to her babysitter, mother, a police office and an 
emergency room nurse and doctor, stating that petitioner had “choked and threatened 
her,” “touch[ed] her in the wrong places,” and that “petitioner had ‘put his mouth on her 
front part.’” Id. The child’s first statement was to the babysitter and was made immediately 
after the babysitter “was awakened by [the child’s] scream,” and witnessed the petitioner 
leaving the child’s room. Id. The child’s second statement was made to her mother ap-
proximately thirty minutes after the first statement. Id. The statement to the police officer 
was made about forty-five minutes after the babysitter was awakened by the scream. Id. at 
349–50. Approximately four hours after the babysitter first heard the child’s scream, the 
child was brought to the hospital and was examined by an emergency nurse and doctor. Id. 
at 350. There, the child “provided an account of events that was essentially identical to the 
one she had given” previously. Id. The child never testified at trial because she “experi-
enced emotional difficulty on being brought to the courtroom.” Id. The trial court permit-
ted admission of the child’s statements to her babysitter, mother and the police officer 
under the hearsay exception for spontaneous declarations and admitted the statements 
made to the emergency room nurse and doctor under the spontaneous declarations ex-
ception and the “exception for statements made in the course of securing medical treat-
ment.” Id. at 350–51. 
41 Id. at 356. “[T]he evidentiary rationale for permitting hearsay testimony regarding 
spontaneous declarations and statements made in the course of receiving medical care is 
that such out-of-court declarations are made in contexts that provide substantial guaran-
tees of their trustworthiness.” Id. at 355. 
42 Id. at 356. The Court noted that “[a] statement that had been offered in a moment 
of excitement . . . may justifiably carry more weight with a trier of fact than a similar state-
ment offered in the relative calm of the courtroom.” Id. Likewise, “a statement made in the 
course of procuring medical services . . . carries special guarantees of credibility that a trier 
of fact may not think replicated by courtroom testimony.” Id. As a result, exclusion of these 
statements posed a “threat of lost evidentiary value if the out-of-court statements were re-
placed with live testimony.” Id. at 356. The Court concluded that “[t]o exclude such proba-
tive statements under the strictures of the Confrontation Clause would be the height of 
wrongheadedness.” Id. 
43 See id. at 355–56; Carr, supra note 32, at 639. The Court found that the Roberts rule 
applied “with full force to the case at hand.” White, 502 U.S. at 355. The Court continued, 
stating that “[t]here can be no doubt that the two [hearsay] exceptions for spontaneous 
declarations and statements made in the course of receiving medical care . . . are ‘firmly 
rooted.’” Id. at 355 n.8. 
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because they lacked “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”44 
Utilizing a totality of the circumstances test, the Court found that the 
child had been questioned suggestively and, consequently, there was 
“no special reason for supposing that the incriminating statements were 
particularly trust-worthy.”45 
 While the Court did not articulate what circumstances would result 
in a finding of “trustworthiness,” it did draw attention to the lower 
court’s observation that the statements could have been found trust-
worthy had “certain procedural safeguards” been used.46 Specifically, 
the lower court suggested that had the statements been videotaped, a 
jury could assess the reliability of the statements.47 Furthermore, video-
taping the statements could have ensured that the interviewing tech-
niques did not mislead the child to make false statements.48 
 Thus, under the Roberts rule, out-of-court statements by child vic-
tims of sexual abuse were admissible if they fell under a “firmly rooted 
hearsay exception” or bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness.”49 At trial, most out-of-court statements are admitted under the 
                                                                                                                      
44 Wright, 497 U.S. at 827. In Wright, the petitioner was charged with two counts of lewd 
conduct with a minor under sixteen. Id. at 808. The victims were the petitioner’s daugh-
ters, who were five and a half and two and a half years old at the time the crimes were 
charged. Id. The statements in question were the ones made by the younger daughter to 
an examining physician. Id. at 809. The statements were admitted under Idaho’s residual 
hearsay exception. Id. at 811. The child did not testify at trial because it was determined 
that she “was ‘not capable of communicating to the jury.’” Id. at 809–10. 
45 Id. at 826. The Court found that the residual hearsay exception, under which the 
statements were admitted, was not a firmly rooted hearsay exception. See id. at 817. In addi-
tion, the statements did not meet the requirements for admission under the exceptions of 
excited utterances or statements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. 
See id. at 827. Consequently, the Court evaluated the admissibility of the out-of-court state-
ments by determining whether the statements showed “particularized guarantees of trust-
worthiness.” Id. at 818. 
46 See id. at 818. 
47 See id. at 813; Carr, supra note 32, at 640. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote for the 
majority that, “The [Idaho Supreme Court] found Dr. Jambura’s interview technique in-
adequate because ‘the questions and answers were not recorded on videotape for preser-
vation and perusal by the defense at or before trial . . . .’” Wright, 497 U.S. at 812–13 (quot-
ing State v. Wright, 775 P.2d 1224, 1227, 1230 (Idaho 1989)). Further, she noted that “the 
court found that ‘[t]he circumstances surrounding this interview demonstrate dangers of 
unreliability which, because the interview was not [audio or video] recorded, can never be 
fully assessed.’” Id. at 813 (quoting Wright, 775 P.2d at 1227, 1230). 
48 See Wright, 497 U.S. at 813. Justice O’Connor noted that the lower court had found 
that the “‘interrogation was performed by someone with a preconceived idea of what the 
child should be disclosing’” and that “children are susceptible to suggestion and are there-
fore likely to be misled by leading questions.” Id (quoting Wright, 775 P.2d at 1227). The 
lower court then stated that the “dangers of reliability which, because the interview was not 
recorded, can never be fully assessed.” Id (quoting Wright, 775 P.2d at 1227). 
49 See White, 502 U.S. at 356–57; Wright, 497 U.S. at 827; Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
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hearsay exceptions for excited utterances, statements made for the 
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, or state law hearsay excep-
tions for statements made by child victims of sexual abuse.50 Determi-
nation of whether there were “particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness” required an examination of the totality of the circumstances, and 
courts were free to consider factors such as whether the out-of-court 
statements were videotaped to make that decision.51 
B. Crawford v. Washington: The Testimonial Standard 
 In 2004, the Supreme Court decided Crawford, which severely lim-
ited the application of the Roberts reliability rule and introduced a new 
standard for testimonial statements: “Where testimonial evidence is at 
issue . . . the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law re-
quired: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”52 
                                                                                                                      
50 See Carr, supra note 32, at 643 (“Excited utterance and medical diagnosis were two 
common justifications for hearsay admission in [child sexual abuse] cases.”); Myrna S. 
Raeder, Comments on Child Abuse Litigation in a “Testimonial” World: The Intersection of Compe-
tency, Hearsay, and Confrontation, 82 Ind. L.J. 1009, 1009 (2007) (“Hearsay [is] primarily 
introduced in the context of excited utterances, statements for medical diagnosis or 
treatment, forensic interviews, or via ad hoc exceptions.”); see also White, 502 U.S. at 350–51 
(out-of-court statements made to a babysitter, the victim’s mother and the police were 
admitted pursuant to the hearsay exception for spontaneous declarations and statements 
made to a nurse and a doctor were admitted under the hearsay exceptions for spontane-
ous declarations and statements made for the purposes of medical treatment and diagno-
sis); People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 920 (Colo. 2006) (out-of-court statements made to the 
victim’s father and the victim’s father’s friend admitted as excited utterances and state-
ments made to a doctor admitted under the exception for statements made for purposes 
of medical diagnosis and treatment); State v. Webb, 779 P.2d 1108, 1110 (Utah 1989) 
(child victim’s out-of-court statements to her mother admitted under state hearsay excep-
tion for “hearsay statements of a child who is an alleged victim of sexual abuse”). 
51 See Wright, 497 U.S. at 818, 826. 
52 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia criticized the Rob-
erts reliability rule, stating: 
[The Roberts rule] departs from the historical principles [of the Confronta-
tion Clause] in two respects. First, it is too broad: It applies the same mode of 
analysis whether or not the hearsay consists of ex parte testimony. This often 
results in close constitutional scrutiny in cases that are far removed from the 
core concerns of the Clause. At the same time, however, the test is too nar-
row: It admits statements that do consist of ex parte testimony upon a mere 
finding of reliability. This malleable standard often fails to protect against 
paradigmatic confrontation violations. 
Id. at 60. He continued: 
 Reliability is an amorphous, if not entirely subjective, concept. There are 
countless factors bearing on whether a statement is reliable . . . .Whether a 
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 In arriving at the decision, Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the 
majority, looked to the historical background of the Confrontation 
Clause.53 Focusing on the 1603 trial of Sir Walter Raleigh for treason, 
he asserted that this “paradigmatic confrontation violation” revealed 
“two inferences about the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.”54 First, 
the Confrontation Clause is directed principally at the “use of ex parte 
examinations as evidence against the accused.”55 Second, such state-
ments of an unavailable witness could not be used at trial if the defen-
dant did not have “a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”56 
 With these concerns in mind, Justice Scalia fashioned a new stan-
dard by which to evaluate the admissibility of out-of-court statements 
when witnesses are unavailable to testify at trial.57 Looking to the text of 
the Confrontation Clause, he noted that it “applie[d] to ‘witnesses’ 
against the accused—in other words, those who ‘bear testimony.’”58 He 
then defined a class of out-of-court statements, “‘testimonial’ state-
                                                                                                                      
statement is deemed reliable depends heavily on which factors the judge con-
siders and how much weight he accords each of them. . . . 
 The unpardonable vice of the Roberts test, however, is not its unpredictabil-
ity, but its demonstrated capacity to admit core testimonial statements that 
the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude. 
Id. at 63 (citation omitted). Justice Scalia concluded: “Where testimonial statements are at 
issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one 
the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.” Id. at 68–69. 
In Crawford, petitioner stabbed a man who allegedly attempted to rape his wife, Sylvia. 
Id. at 38. Police questioned Sylvia regarding the incident, and she stated that she did not 
see anything in the victim’s hands at the time of the stabbing. See id. at 39–40. At trial, peti-
tioner claimed self-defense and the state offered Sylvia’s tape-recorded statements to the 
police as evidence that the attack was not in self-defense. See id. at 40. Sylvia did not testify 
at trial because of the state’s marital privilege, which bars a spouse’s testimony when there 
is no consent from the other spouse. See id. Sylvia’s statements were admitted under the 
hearsay exception for statements against penal interest because Sylvia had admitted to the 
police that she had “facilitated the assault.” See id. 
53 See id. at 42–43 (“The Constitution’s text does not alone resolve this case. . . . We 
must therefore turn to the historical background of the Clause to understand its mean-
ing.”). 
54 Id. at 50, 52. During Sir Walter Raleigh’s trial, his alleged collaborator, Lord Cob-
ham, “implicated [Raleigh] in an examination before the Privy Council and in a letter.” Id. 
at 44. These statements were later admitted at trial. Id. Raleigh asserted that Cobham was 
lying to save himself and demanded that the judges present Cobham so that Raleigh could 
confront him. Id. The judges refused and Raleigh was found guilty and sentenced to 
death. Id. 
55 See id. at 50. 
56 See id. at 53–54. 
57 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. 
58 See id. 
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ments,” that would trigger the protection of the Confrontation Clause.59 
Based on a dictionary definition of testimony, these statements were 
characterized as “[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the 
purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”60 Although Justice Scalia 
distinguished between out-of-court statements that are testimonial and 
those that are not, he left “for another day any effort to spell out a com-
prehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’”61 
 He did, however, articulate three “various formulations” that tes-
timonial statements could take: (1) “ex parte in-court testimony or its 
functional equivalent,” (2) “extrajudicial statements contained in for-
malized testimonial material,” and (3) “statements that were made un-
der circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to 
believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.”62 
He proceeded to assert that “statements taken by police officers in the 
course of interrogations are . . . testimonial.”63 
 Thus, under Crawford, out-of-court statements that a judge deter-
mines to be testimonial will only be admitted at trial if the witness is 
unavailable to testify and there was a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.64 What constituted a testimonial statement, however, re-
mained vaguely defined.65 
                                                                                                                      
59 See id. 
60 See id. 
61 Id. at 68. When distinguishing between testimonial and non-testimonial out-of-court 
statements, Justice Scalia noted that “[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to gov-
ernment officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an 
acquaintance does not.” Id. at 51. 
62 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52. Materials in the first category consist of “affidavits, 
custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, 
or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecu-
torially.” Id. at 51. The second formulation consists of “affidavits, depositions, prior testi-
mony, or confessions.” Id. at 52. Justice Scalia further stated that “[w]hatever else the term 
[testimonial] covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, 
before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.” Id. at 68. 
63 See id. at 52. Justice Scalia explained that “[i]nvolvement of government officers in 
the production of testimony with an eye toward trial presents unique potential for prose-
cutorial abuse.” Id. at 56 n.7. He also clarified that “[j]ust as various definitions of ‘testi-
monial’ exist, one can imagine various definitions of ‘interrogation.’” Id. at 53 n.4. Like 
the definition of testimonial, however, Justice Scalia did not expound on the definition of 
interrogation, stating “we need not select among [its definitions] in this case.” Id. 
64 See id. at 68. In Crawford, admission of Sylvia’s statements to the police violated the 
Confrontation Clause because her statements were testimonial and petitioner did not have 
an opportunity to cross-examine her. Id. 
65 See id. 
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C. Davis v. Washington: The Primary Purpose Test 
 Two years after Crawford, Justice Scalia had the opportunity to pro-
vide clarification to the definition of “testimonial.”66 In Davis v. Wash-
ington, the Supreme Court considered when statements made to the 
police are testimonial, and thus, subject to the Confrontation Clause.67 
Justice Scalia, again writing for the Court, introduced the primary pur-
pose test as a means to determine whether statements to the police are 
testimonial: 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of 
police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicat-
ing that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable 
police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are tes-
timonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that 
there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary 
purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past 
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.68 
 Davis combined two cases in which the Court evaluated, using the 
newly minted primary purpose test, the statements of two domestic vio-
lence victims that were made to police officers or government person-
nel.69 In the first case, Davis v. Washington, the issue was whether “the 
interrogation that took place in the course of the 911 call produced tes-
timonial statements.”70 The Court determined that the circumstances of 
the call “objectively indicate[d that] its primary purpose was to enable 
police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”71 As such, the victim 
                                                                                                                      
66 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). 
67 See id. 
68 Id. at 822. 
69 See id. at 817–21. In Davis v. Washington, the domestic violence victim, Michelle 
McCottry, made statements to a 911 emergency operator identifying her abuser as Adrian 
Davis. Id. at 817–18. Davis was charged with a “felony violation of a domestic no-contact 
order.” Id. at 818. At trial, the 911 call was admitted into evidence, and McCottry did not 
testify. Id. at 819. Davis was convicted. Id. In Hammon v. Indiana, after being questioned by 
the police, the domestic violence victim, Amy Hammon, filled out a battery affidavit de-
scribing the actions of her husband, Hershel. Id. at 820. Hershel was then charged with 
domestic battery. Id. Amy’s statements to the police and the affidavit were admitted at 
Hershel’s bench trial, and Amy did not testify. Id. Hershel was found guilty. Id. at 821. 
70 Id. at 826. In regards to whether 911 operators are police officers for the purposes of 
the Confrontation Clause, the Court stated: “If 911 operators are not themselves law en-
forcement officers, they may at least be agents of law enforcement when they conduct 
interrogations of 911 callers. For purposes of this opinion (and without deciding the 
point), we consider their acts to be acts of the police.” Id. at 823 n.2. 
71 Davis, 547 U.S. at 828. The Court noted: 
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caller “was not acting as a witness; she was not testifying.”72 Consequently, 
her statements identifying her abuser were not testimonial.73 
 The second case, Hammon v. Indiana, involved statements that the 
victim made to police during an interrogation and wrote in an affida-
vit.74 The Court found that the circumstances surrounding these state-
ments indicated that “they were not much different from the state-
ments . . . found to be testimonial in Crawford.”75 The Court held that 
                                                                                                                      
In Davis, McCottry was speaking about events as they were actually happening, 
rather than “describ[ing] past events[]”. . . . Moreover, any reasonable lis-
tener would recognize that McCottry (unlike Sylvia Crawford) was facing an 
ongoing emergency. Although one might call 911 to provide a narrative report 
of a crime absent any imminent danger, McCottry’s call was plainly a call for 
help against bona fide physical threat. Third, the nature of what was asked 
and answered in Davis, again viewed objectively, was such that the elicited 
statements were necessary to be able to resolve the present emergency, rather 
than simply to learn (as in Crawford) what had happened in the past. That is 
true even of the operator’s effort to establish the identity of the assailant, so 
that the dispatched officers might know whether they would be encountering 
a violent felon. And finally, the difference in the level of formality between 
the two interviews is striking. Crawford was responding calmly, at the station 
house, to a series of questions, with the officer-interrogator taping and mak-
ing notes of her answers; McCottry’s frantic answers were provided over the 
phone, in an environment that was not tranquil, or even (as far as any rea-
sonable 911 operator could make out) safe. 
Id. at 827 (citations omitted). 
72 Id. at 828. 
73 See id. at 829. 
74 See id. at 820. 
75 See id. at 829. Regarding the circumstances surrounding the challenged statements, 
the Court noted: 
There was no emergency in progress; the interrogating officer testified that 
he had heard no arguments or crashing and saw no one throw or break any-
thing. When the officers first arrived, Amy told them that things were fine, 
and there was no immediate threat to her person. When the officer ques-
tioned Amy for the second time, and elicited the challenged statements, he 
was not seeking to determine (as in Davis) “what is happening,” but rather 
“what happened.” 
Id. at 829–30 (citations omitted). Furthermore, the Court noted the similarities between 
the statements made in the present case and in Crawford: 
What we called the “striking resemblance” of the Crawford statement to civil-
law ex parte examinations is shared by Amy’s statement here. Both declarants 
were actively separated from the defendant-officers forcibly prevented 
Hershel from participating in the interrogation. Both statements deliberately 
recounted, in response to police questioning, how potentially criminal past 
events began and progressed. And both took place some time after the events 
described were over. Such statements under official interrogation are an ob-
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“[o]bjectively viewed, the primary, if not indeed the sole, purpose of 
the interrogation was to investigate a possible crime.”76 Consequently, 
the statements were “inherently testimonial.”77 
 Thus, Davis provides that a court should look to the primary pur-
pose of the interrogation to determine whether out-of-court statements 
to law enforcement officials or their agents are testimonial.78 State-
ments made during an emergency or in an effort to obtain help are not 
testimonial.79 Nevertheless, statements made to establish events that 
may be relevant to future prosecution are testimonial.80 
D. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts: A Reaffirmation 
 In 2009, Justice Scalia reaffirmed the testimonial standard set forth 
in Crawford.81 In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court con-
sidered whether affidavits reporting the results of forensic analysis were 
“testimonial,” thus making those who performed the lab tests “wit-
                                                                                                                      
vious substitute for live testimony, because they do precisely what a witness does 
on direct examination . . . . 
Id. at 830 (citations omitted). 
76 Davis, 547 U.S. at 830. 
77 See id. 
78 See id. at 822. 
79 See id. 
80 Id. 
81 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2531–32 (2009). In the days follow-
ing the Melendez-Diaz decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Briscoe v. Virginia, 
which presents the question: 
If a state allows a prosecutor to introduce a certificate of a forensic laboratory 
analysis, without presenting the testimony of the analyst who prepared the 
certificate, does the state avoid violating the Confrontation Clause of the 
Sixth Amendment by providing that the accused has a right to call the analyst 
as his own witness? 
Question Presented in Briscoe v. Virginia, United States Supreme Court Docket for 07–11191, 
http://origin.www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/07-11191qp.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2009); 
see Briscoe v. Virginia, 129 S. Ct. 2858 (2009). While the questions presented in both Melendez-
Diaz and Briscoe do not directly affect the subject of this Note, any opportunity the Court has 
to clarify the meaning of Crawford will have a significant impact on evidence law. For initial 
commentary on the decision to grant certiorari to Briscoe in light of the decision in Melendez-
Diaz, see Lyle Denniston, Analysis: Is Melendez-Diaz already endangered?, SCOTUSblog, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/new-lab-report-case-granted/ ( June 29, 2009, 13:51 EST) 
and Colin Miller, Chicken Little or Canary In the Coal Mine?, Take 3: Could Briscoe v. Vir-
ginia Lead to An Immediate Overturning of Melendez-Diaz?, EvidenceProf Blog, http://law-
professors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2009/07/chicken-little-or-canary-in-the-coal-mine-
take-3.html ( July 1, 2009). 
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nesses” and subject to a defendant’s right of confrontation.82 In a five 
to four decision, Justice Scalia, writing again for the Court, asserted that 
“[t]his case involves little more than the application of our holding in 
Crawford v. Washington.”83 
 In deciding whether “certificates of analysis” were testimonial, the 
Court noted that these documents were “functionally identical to live, 
in-court testimony, doing ‘precisely what a witness does on direct ex-
amination.’”84 Invoking Crawford’s various formulations of testimonial 
statements, the Court stated that “[t]here is little doubt that the docu-
ments at issue . . . fall within the ‘core class of testimonial statements’ 
thus described.”85 In fact, these certificates of analysis fit into all three 
of the various formulations set forth in Crawford.86 
 Notably, the Court stressed, in particular, that the certificates were 
“made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness rea-
sonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later 
trial.”87 It highlighted that under Massachusetts law, the sole purpose of 
such documents was “to provide ‘prima facie evidence of the composi-
tion, quality, and the net weight’ of the analyzed substance.”88 As such, 
because the analysts knew of the certificates’ evidentiary purpose, the 
certificates were testimonial statements and the lab analysts were “wit-
nesses” for the purposes of the Confrontation Clause.89 Absent a show-
ing of unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination, the 
Court concluded that under the Sixth Amendment, the defendant was 
entitled to confront the lab analysts at trial.90 
                                                                                                                      
82 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2530. In Melendez-Diaz, the defendant, Luis Melendez-
Diaz, was charged with distributing and trafficking cocaine after the police found nineteen 
small plastic bags in the backseat of the police cruiser where the defendant had previously 
been. Id. The police submitted these bags to the state laboratory for chemical analysis. Id. 
At trial, the prosecution entered into evidence the “‘certificates of analysis’ showing the 
results of the forensic analysis performed on the seized substances.” Id. at 2530–31. The 
certificates contained “the following results: The substance was found to contain: Co-
caine.” Id. at 2531. The defendant objected to the admission of the certificates based upon 
Confrontation Clause concerns, asserting that Crawford required the lab analysts testify in 
person. Id. The objection was overruled and a jury found Melendez-Diaz guilty. Id. 
83 Id. at 2542. 
84 Id. at 2532 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 830). 
85 Id. 
86 See id. The Court noted that “[t]he documents at issue here . . . are quite plainly af-
fidavits” and that affidavits fall into two of the formulations described in Crawford. Id.; see 
also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 52. 
87 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62). 
88 Id. (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 111, § 13). 
89 See id. 
90 See id. 
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 Consequently, Melendez-Diaz not only affirms Crawford’s testimo-
nial standard, but also provides greater guidance regarding its appli-
cation.91 Most importantly, the opinion rests heavily on the third for-
mulation of “testimonial” —the standard that requires a finding of 
testimonial for any statement “made under circumstances which 
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the state-
ment would be available for use at a later trial.”92 The decision to ap-
ply this standard suggests that while Crawford articulated three forms 
that testimonial statements could take, lower courts should be most 
concerned with the third, most expansive formulation.93 Melendez-Diaz 
demonstrates the Court’s embrace of a broad, encompassing defini-
tion of testimonial.94 
II. Challenges to Prosecuting Child Sexual Abuse Cases 
 Notwithstanding the difficulties posed by the evolving Confronta-
tion Clause standard, the prosecution of child sexual abuse cases itself 
has historically been challenging.95 These challenges stem primarily 
from the nature of such cases and the overwhelming reliance on chil-
dren as witnesses.96 Consequently, these cases present unique frustra-
                                                                                                                      
91 See id. at 2532, 2542. 
92 See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532. Professor Friedman, in his initial reaction to the 
decision, commented: 
[T]hen the Court gives an underlying basis. Although it had just quoted the 
three definitions of “testimonial” recited by Crawford, now it just applied one, 
the right one (or at least the one closest to right)—the statements were made 
“under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to be-
lieve that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.” And under 
that standard, the case is an easy one; indeed, the sole purpose of the certifi-
cates was evidentiary. Easy case. 
Richard D. Friedman, An Initial Reaction to the Melendez-Diaz Decision, The Confronta-
tion Blog, http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2009/06/initial-reaction-to-melendez-
diaz.html ( June 25, 2009, 20:05 EST). 
93 See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532; Friedman, supra note 92. 
94 See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532; Friedman, supra note 92. 
95 See Brief for the National Ass’n of Counsel for Children as Amicus Curiae Support-
ing Respondents at 9, Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (No. 05–5224) [hereinaf-
ter Davis Amicus Brief] (“‘Child abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to detect and 
prosecute. . . .’ This has long been the case.” (quoting Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 
60 (1987)); Robert D. Friedman, The Conundrum of Children, Confrontation, and Hearsay, 
Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter 2002, at 243, 243 (“The adjudication of child abuse 
claims poses an excruciatingly difficult conundrum. The crime is a terrible one, but false 
convictions are abhorrent.”). 
96 See Davis Amicus Brief, supra note 95, at 7 (noting that “most sexual abuse is perpe-
trated by adults who are close to the child”); John C. Yuille et al., Interviewing Children in 
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tions in regards to ensuring the confrontation rights of the accused, 
especially in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Crawford and 
Davis.97 Specifically, the secretive nature of child sexual abuse, the fact 
that children are often the only eyewitnesses to the crime, concerns 
about the reliability of child testimony, and the unavailability of child 
witnesses to testify at trial challenge prosecutors and courts in their at-
tempt to balance the effective prosecution of child sexual abuse and 
the constitutional rights of the accused.98 
A. The Nature of the Crime and Children as Eyewitnesses 
 Prosecution of child sexual abuse cases is difficult primarily be-
cause the crime is committed in secret.99 In most cases, the perpetrator 
is a person close to the victim and induces silence through threats and 
violence.100 In an amicus brief filed in support of the respondents in 
Davis, the Counsel for Children’s Amicus Brief stated that “more than 
                                                                                                                      
Sexual Abuse Cases, in Child Victims, Child Witnesses: Understanding and Improving 
Testimony 95, 96 (Gail S. Goodman & Bette L. Bottoms eds., 1993) (stating that knowl-
edge of what happened in child sexual abuse cases often depends on the child victim’s 
statement); Raeder, supra note 50, at 1009 (noting that child sexual abuse usually takes 
place in secret). 
97 See, e.g., Davis Amicus Brief, supra note 95, at 11 (stating that because of reliability 
concerns regarding child witnesses and unrealistic jury expectations, “prosecutors may be 
forced in some cases to rely upon child’s out-of-court statements”); Tom Lininger, Kids Say 
the Darndest Things: The Prosecutorial Use of Hearsay Statements by Children, 82 Ind. L.J. 999, 
1000–01 (2007) (noting the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court regarding child 
sexual abuse cases and confrontation rights under Crawford); Aviva A. Orenstein, Children 
as Witnesses: A Symposium on Child Competence and the Accused’s Right to Confront Child Wit-
nesses, 82 Ind. L.J. 909, 909 (2007) (describing concerns regarding children as witnesses). 
98 See, e.g., Davis Amicus Brief, supra note 95, at 9 (stating that “prosecutors face a num-
ber of hurdles when presenting child witnesses”); Yuille et al., supra note 96, at 95–96 
(describing the dearth of helpful evidence in child sexual abuse cases); Friedman, supra 
note 95, at 243 (acknowledging the “conundrum” of “adjudication of child abuse claims” 
and noting that “[o]ften the evidence does not support a finding of guilt or innocence 
with sufficient clarity to allow a decision free of gnawing doubt”); Mosteller, supra note 27, 
at 921 (discussing the limitations and deficiencies of child testimony, including legal de-
terminations of unavailability). 
99 Raeder, supra note 50, at 1009. 
100 Davis Amicus Brief, supra note 95, at 2; see also In re Rolandis G., 902 N.E.2d 600, 
604 (Ill. 2008) (child victim stated that his abuser “threatened him with a stick” . . . and 
made him “‘pinky swear’ not to tell anyone”), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2747 (2009); State v. 
Muttart, 875 N.E.2d 944, 948 (Ohio 2007) (child victim reported that her abuser threat-
ened that “if she told her mother or grandmothers [of the abuse], her mother would be 
taken to jail”), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2473 (2008). The Counsel for Children went on to 
state, “child sexual abuse and other forms of child maltreatment are pervasive, yet most 
victims suffer in silence.” Davis Amicus Brief, supra note 95, at 2. For further discussion 
regarding the reasons victims often fail to disclose sexual abuse, see id. at 6–9. 
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500,000 children fall victim to abuse every year” and that “only about 
ten percent of child sexual abuse is ever reported to the authorities.”101 
 Furthermore, if the sexual abuse is disclosed, there is often limited 
evidence from which to prosecute.102 Physical evidence is rare, and 
even if present, usually does not identify the accused.103 In addition, the 
child victim and the accused are typically the only witnesses to the 
crime.104 Consequently, child sexual abuse remains one of the least 
prosecuted crimes.105 
B. The Reliability of Child Witnesses 
 Notwithstanding the evidentiary challenges, the prosecutorial reli-
ance on child witnesses raises general concerns about the reliability of 
child testimony.106 Specifically, when evaluating the reliability of out-of-
court statements made by child victims, courts have expressed particu-
lar concern with a child’s susceptibility to leading questioning and out-
side influences during investigative interviews.107 
 Most disclosures in child sexual abuse cases occur first to family 
members and then to police officers, doctors, nurses, and social work-
                                                                                                                      
101 Davis Amicus Brief, supra note 95, at 5–6. For more information regarding the per-
vasiveness of child sexual abuse, see id. at 5–6. 
102 See id. at 9; Yuille et al., supra note 96, at 95–96; Raeder, supra note 50, at 1009. 
103 See Yuille et al., supra note 96, at 95. “No physical evidence . . . may be present be-
cause of the nature of the abuse or because children heal quickly and the crime is often 
reported well after it occurred.” Raeder, supra note 50, at 1009. 
104 See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 166 (1995) (“In almost all cases [of child 
sexual abuse] a youth is the prosecution’s only eyewitness.”); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 
U.S. 39, 60 (1987) (“Child abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to detect and prose-
cute, in large part because there often are no witnesses except the victim.”); Davis Amicus 
Brief, supra note 95, at 9; Yuille et al., supra note 96, at 95; Raeder, supra note 50, at 1009. 
105 Davis Amicus Brief, supra note 95, at 9. 
106 See Orenstein, supra note 97, at 909; Raeder, supra note 50, at 1009. Professor Oren-
stein writes: 
Concerns that arise with adult witnesses are heightened with children. . . . 
With children, whose practical knowledge of the world is incomplete and who 
are especially dependent on others emotionally and physically, the potential 
for undue influence and bias increases. Relatedly, outright intimidation, an-
other potential problem for adult witnesses, demands a more complicated 
and sensitive inquiry when child witnesses are involved. 
Orenstein, supra note 97, at 909. 
107 See, e.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 826 (1990) (finding that the child had been 
questioned suggestively by a doctor); People v. Stechly, 870 N.E.2d 333, 343 (Ill. 2007) 
(defendant’s expert witness, a clinical psychologist, criticized the questioning techniques 
utilized to interview the child victim). 
2010] The Admissibility of Videotaped Forensic Interviews in Child Sex Abuse Cases 85 
ers.108 Often, police officers, doctors, nurses, and social workers are not 
specifically trained to question children about sexual abuse; conse-
quently, untrained questioning can lead to errors in interviewing.109 
The problem with untrained interviewing is two-fold.110 First, without 
specific training on how to properly question children, questioners are 
often unaware of developmental changes in language ability and cogni-
tion.111 This unawareness can result in misinterpretations of the child’s 
statements and misunderstandings between the questioner and the 
child.112 Second, untrained questioners may engage in suggestive ques-
tioning because of professional biases.113 As a result, these untrained 
questioners are unable to obtain reliable and valid information.114 
 Even if, however, an interview is properly conducted, juries often 
perceive statements by child witnesses as unreliable.115 Jurors regard 
children’s statements with skepticism as a result of “concerns about [a 
child’s] susceptibility to suggestion, manipulation, coaching, or confus-
ing fact with fantasy.”116 These jury expectations ultimately make the 
presentation and effectiveness of child witnesses extremely difficult.117 
                                                                                                                      
108 See Davis Amicus Brief, supra note 95, at 8. 
109 See Yuille et al., supra note 96, at 97; Lindsay E. Cronch et al., Forensic Interviewing 
in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: Current Techniques and Future Directions, 11 Aggression & Vio-
lent Behavior 195, 196 (2006). The Cronch article notes that, “bad interviewing can lead 
to serious consequences. These may include eliciting false allegations, putting children 
and families through unnecessary stress, decreasing a child victim’s credibility in court, 
contaminating facts, reducing probability of conviction, draining resources through un-
successful trials and investigations, and reducing resources for legitimate abuse cases.” 
Cronch et al., supra, at 196. 
110 See Yuille et al., supra note 96, at 98. 
111 See id. 
112 See id. For example, children who disclose their sexual abuse use a variety of words 
to describe their own anatomy and that of their abuser. See, e.g., People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 
916, 919 (Colo. 2006) (child victim reported that his abuser “stuck his winkie in his butt”); 
State v. Henderson, 160 P.3d 776, 778–79 (Kan. 2007) (child victim stated that her abuser 
touched her “potty place” with his “ding ding”); Commonwealth v. DeOliveira, 849 N.E.2d 
218, 222 (Mass. 2006) (child victim referred to her abuser’s penis as a “pee pee”); State v. 
Justus, 205 S.W.3d 872, 876 (Mo. 2006) (child victim described her abuser’s penis as “look-
ing like a ‘tail’ with a ‘knob’ on the end”). Often, these terms are not precise and are not 
used consistently. See, e.g., Henderson, 160 P.3d at 779–80 (child victim identified a penis as 
both a “ding ding” and a “hot dog”); Justus, 205 S.W.3d at 876 (child victim referred to 
both her abuser’s penis and her vagina as a “pee-pee”). 
113 See Yuille et al., supra note 96, at 98. These professional biases can include beliefs 
that children are inherently incorrect or that children never lie about abuse. See id. 
114 See id. at 97. 
115 See Davis Amicus Brief, supra note 95, at 10–11. 
116 Raeder, supra note 50, at 1009. 
117 See Davis Amicus Brief, supra note 95, at 10–11. The Counsel for Children also cited 
other unrealistic jury expectations such as “medical evidence of sexual abuse” although 
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C. The Unavailability of Child Witnesses at Trial 
 Lastly, child victims of sexual abuse often do not testify at trial be-
cause courts usually declare them legally unavailable.118 The reasons for 
unavailability, stemming primarily from the age of the child, fall into 
two general categories: competency and trauma.119 
 In the first category, courts find children unavailable because they 
lack the competency to testify in court.120 Generally, courts have found 
                                                                                                                      
“there usually is none” and “strong emotional reactions when describing abuse” when 
“children usually do not.” Id. 
118 See, e.g., Wright, 497 U.S. at 809 (child victim was found unavailable to testify be-
cause of an inability to effectively communicate); Rolandis, 902 N.E.2d at 603 (child victim 
refused to answer questions regarding the abuse when called to testify); Stechly, 870 N.E.2d 
at 340–41 (child victim found unavailable because of the risk of trauma); Henderson, 160 
P.3d at 781 (child victim unavailable to testify because she could not understand the im-
portance of the proceedings, the oath, or the need to tell the truth). 
119 See Davis Amicus Brief, supra note 95, at 9–10. Compare Wright, 497 U.S. at 809 (find-
ing a child unavailable to testify because she could not effectively communicate to the 
jury), and Henderson, 160 P.3d at 781 (finding a child unavailable to testify because she was 
unable to understand the questions, the importance of the trial, the relevance of the oath, 
or the necessity to tell the truth), with State v. Contreras, 979 So. 2d 896, 899 (Fla. 2008) 
(finding a child unavailable to testify because emotional and psychological trauma would 
result), and Stechly, 870 N.E.2d at 340–41 (finding a child unavailable to testify because she 
“would likely experience trauma symptoms”). 
120 See, e.g., Wright, 497 U.S. at 809; Henderson, 160 P.3d at 781; Justus, 205 S.W.3d at 875. 
Professor Friedman distinguishes between “two different levels of incompetence”: “[t]he 
child who is capable of testifying, but not in a satisfactory manner” and “the child who is 
incapable of testifying.” Richard D. Friedman, Child Witnesses on the Academic & Judicial 
Front, The Confrontation Blog, http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2007/09/child-
witnesses-on-academic-and.html (Sept. 7, 2009, 17:10 EST). The first level refers to a child 
who “lacks a sufficient sense of obligation to tell the truth for her testimony to be accepted 
in court.” Id. In other words, “the child is not capable of testifying in court in a satisfactory 
manner.” Id. Thus, “a deeper level of incompetence [occurs when] the child is (or a child 
of ordinary understanding of her age would be) so insufficiently developed that the state-
ment should not be deemed testimonial at all.” Id. The child “is just not capable of engag-
ing in the kind of activity—witnessing—covered by the confrontation right.” Id. While this 
distinction is helpful in considering whether or when children are capable of making tes-
timonial statements and may (or should, as Professor Friedman argues) influence whether 
the out-of-court statements are admitted at trial, it does not have direct bearing on the 
primary issue addressed in this Note. The distinction is mentioned here to acknowledge 
the academic distinction, but for the purposes of this Note, the child victim is assumed to 
be found unavailable for any legitimate legal reason. Case law and legal scholars support 
this assumption. See, e.g., Bobadilla v. Carlson, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1102 (D. Minn. 2008) 
( judge ruled child victim “not competent to testify”), aff’d, 575 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2009); 
Rolandis, 902 N.E.2d at 603 (on the stand, child victim “could not bring himself to answer 
questions about the allegations concerning [the defendant]”); Henderson, 160 P.3d at 781 
( judge ruled that the child witness was unavailable to testify as a witness because she is 
unable to understand the questions or the importance of the proceedings or oath); see also 
Friedman, supra note 95, at 252 n.34 (“The key point is that, whatever the precise nature of 
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a child incompetent to testify when the child demonstrates that he or 
she cannot effectively communicate to the jury, fails to qualify to take 
the oath, or generally lacks the requisite understanding of what consti-
tutes the truth.121 In the second category, children are deemed unavail-
able because of the trauma associated with testifying in court.122 In 
these cases, there is a general concern that the circumstances sur-
rounding testifying, such as the unfamiliar legal environment or the 
aggressive cross-examination, will emotionally and psychologically harm 
the child.123 In addition, even if child victims take the stand, occasion-
ally they freeze during testimony and refuse to answer questions regard-
ing the abuse, resulting in no valuable testimony.124 Consequently, the 
high rate of unavailability for child witnesses causes prosecutors to rely 
heavily on out-of-court statements.125 
                                                                                                                      
the critical capacity may be, at some point a child will be insufficiently mature to be 
deemed a witness.”). 
121 See, e.g., Wright, 497 U.S. at 809 (three-year-old victim was found unavailable to tes-
tify because she “was ‘not capable of communicating to the jury’”); Henderson, 160 P.3d at 
781 (child victim found unavailable because she is “unable to really understand the ques-
tions,” “the importance of [the] proceedings,” “the application of the oath, the relevance 
of the oath or the requirement to tell the truth”); Justus, 205 S.W.3d at 875 (three-year-old 
victim found unavailable “because of severe emotional distress”). 
122 See, e.g., Contreras, 979 So. 2d at 899; Stechly, 870 N.E.2d at 340–41. 
123 See, e.g., Contreras, 979 So. 2d at 899 (child victim was found unavailable to testify 
because the child would “suffer emotional and psychological harm if required to testify”); 
Stechly, 870 N.E.2d at 340–41 (child victim was found unavailable because, “if . . . forced to 
testify, [the child] would likely experience trauma symptoms such as anxiety, sleep distur-
bances, and difficulties in concentrating and paying attention”). 
124 See, e.g., White, 502 U.S. at 350 (child victim “experienced emotional difficulty on 
being brought to the courtroom and in each instance left without testifying”); Rolandis, 
902 N.E.2d at 603 (child victim “resolutely refused to respond” to questions about the 
abuse and “could not bring himself to answer questions about the allegations”). 
125 See, e.g., White, 502 U.S. at 350 (prosecution introduced out-of-court statements the 
child victim made to her babysitter, mother, a police officer, nurse and doctor); Contreras, 
979 So. 2d at 899 (prosecution introduced a videotaped interview with the child victim 
conducted by the coordinator of a child protection team); Rolandis, 902 N.E.2d at 603–04 
(prosecution introduced out-of-court statements the child victim made to his mother and 
two police officers and a videotaped interview conducted by a child advocate at a chil-
dren’s center); Henderson, 160 P.3d at 781 (prosecution introduced the child victim’s out-
of-court statements to her mother, a nurse practitioner, and a police officer and a video-
taped interview with the child conducted by a social worker). 
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D. Confrontation Clause Implications 
 The collective effect of these prosecutorial challenges has particu-
lar implications for the confrontation rights of the accused.126 Because 
most child victims are eyewitnesses to the crime and they are usually 
found unavailable to testify at trial, prosecutors must rely on the child 
victim’s initial disclosures to parents, police officers, nurses, doctors, and 
social workers.127 These out-of-court statements are generally the focus 
of Confrontation Clause attacks because the child victim does not testify 
at trial and the accused rarely has an opportunity to cross-examine the 
child victim regarding the statements.128 
 Pre-Crawford, these confrontation clause challenges were easily 
overcome as long as the prosecution could show that these out-of-court 
statements were sufficiently reliable—specifically, that they “[fell] 
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bore “particularized guar-
antees of trustworthiness.”129 Under the “testimonial standard” set forth 
in Crawford v. Washington and clarified in Davis, however, these out-of-
court statements remain inadmissible as long as they can be shown to 
be “statements that were made under circumstances which would lead 
an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be 
available for use at a later trial” and there was no prior opportunity for 
cross-examination.130 
                                                                                                                      
126 See Raeder, supra note 50, at 1009 (“Crawford and Davis v. Washington up the ante for 
prosecutors who are trying to protect vulnerable young children who are unable or unwill-
ing to testify at trial, because they defeat the admission of testimonial statements.”). 
127 See, e.g., White, 502 U.S. at 350 (prosecution introduced out-of-court statements the 
child victim made to her babysitter, mother, a police officer, nurse and doctor); Contreras, 
979 So. 2d at 899 (prosecution introduced a videotaped interview with the child victim 
conducted by the coordinator of a child protection team); Rolandis, 902 N.E.2d at 603–04 
(prosecution introduced out-of-court statements the child victim made to his mother and 
two police officers and a videotaped interview conducted by a child advocate at a chil-
dren’s center); Henderson, 160 P.3d at 781 (prosecution introduced the child victim’s out-
of-court statements to her mother, a nurse practitioner, and a police officer and a video-
taped interview with the child conducted by a social worker). 
128 See, e.g., White, 502 U.S. at 351 (stating that the Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
decide whether admission of a child victim’s out-of-court statements violated the peti-
tioner’s confrontation rights); Contreras, 979 So. 2d at 900 (defendant arguing on appeal 
that the child victim’s videotaped out-of-court statement violated his confrontation rights); 
Rolandis, 902 N.E.2d at 605 (defendant arguing on appeal that the child victim’s out-of-
court statements to a police officer and social worker violated his confrontation rights); 
DeOliveira, 849 N.E.2d at 224 (defendant arguing on appeal that the child victim’s out-of-
court statements to a doctor violated his confrontation rights). 
129 See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
130 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 817 (2006); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36, 52, 68 (2004). 
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III. Videotaping and Forensic Interviewers: The Solution  
and the Problem 
A. A Solution: Increasing the Reliability of Out-of-Court  
Statements Pre-Crawford 
 In response to pre-Crawford Confrontation Clause concerns, law 
enforcement officials and child advocates took steps, such as using fo-
rensic interviewers and videotaping interviews with child victims, to en-
sure the reliability of out-of-court statements made by child victims.131 
This would guarantee that, under Roberts, the out-of-court statements of 
child victims would be admissible at trial.132 Eventually, the use of fo-
rensic interviewers to question child victims and videotaping those in-
terviews became best practices in order to increase the reliability of a 
child victim’s out-of-court statements.133 
1. Forensic Interviewers 
 One of the main challenges to the reliability of a child victim’s out-
of-court statements arises from the concern that the interviewer is in-
experienced in questioning children, which can result in misunder-
standings and suggestive interviewing.134 As a result, law enforcement 
officials and child advocates now rely on forensic interviewers to inter-
view child victims of sexual abuse.135 
                                                                                                                      
131 See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 812–13 (1990) (suggesting that proper interview-
ing technique and recording of the interview could guarantee the reliability of a child 
victim’s out-of court statements so to ensure the admission of these statements at trial un-
der Roberts); Cronch et al., supra note 109, at 196, 197 (stressing the importance of forensic 
interviews in protecting victims and falsely accused individuals and strongly suggesting that 
interviews should be videotaped). 
132 See Wright, 497 U.S. at 812–13; Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
133 See Theodore P. Cross et al., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Evaluating Children’s Ad-
vocacy Centers’ Response to Child Sexual Abuse 2–3 (2008) (citing forensic inter-
views as a way to increase the effectiveness of child sexual abuse investigations and to ad-
dress concerns that “investigation procedures were insensitive to children”); 1 John E.B. 
Myers, Evidence in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases 84–88 (3d ed. 1997) (suggesting 
that judges favor videotaping and identifying eight arguments for videotaping investigative 
interviews). 
134 See Yuille et al., supra note 96, at 98. 
135 See, e.g., Bobadilla, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1101 (police contacted a social worker who was 
trained in the “‘CornerHouse technique’ — an approach used . . . in interviewing children 
about allegations of sexual abuse” to interview the child victim); State v. Hooper, No. 
31025, 2006 WL 2328233, at *1 (Idaho Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2006) (responding police officer 
arranged for a nurse at the Sexual Trauma Abuse Response (STAR) Center to interview 
the child victim); Bentley, 739 N.W.2d at 297 (police and child protective services arranged 
for a counselor at a child protection center to interview the child victim); State v. Hender-
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 Forensic interviews typically serve multiple purposes: they gather 
information to ensure the health and safety of the child victim while 
also obtaining evidence for law enforcement officials.136 Forensic inter-
viewers are trained specifically to speak to and interview children who 
are victims of abuse.137 Their training thus benefits investigations of 
child sexual abuse by overcoming two distinct obstacles.138 First, be-
                                                                                                                      
son, 160 P.3d 776, 779 (Kan. 2007) (police detective and social worker, both members of 
the Exploited and Missing Children Unit, were contacted to interview child victim); State 
v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314, 316 & n.3 (Md. 2005) (police detective requested that a social 
worker, who testified that she had “extensive training in sexual abuse investigation, foren-
sic interviewing, and sexual abuse interviewing,” interview the child victim). Forensic in-
terviewers are typically social workers, nurses or police officers who are trained in some 
sort of structured interview technique. See Bobadilla v. Carlson, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1101 
(D. Minn. 2008) (noting that the “CornerHouse protocol” is a forensic interviewing ap-
proach that can be used by “police officers, social workers and others”); Cronch et al., 
supra note 109, 196 (“Interviews are typically conducted by law enforcement officers, child 
protective services personnel, or specialized forensic interviewers, although medical and 
mental health professionals often participate as well.”); Mosteller, supra note 27, at 966 
(identifying that “trained questioners” can be “a nurse or social services caseworker”). 
Often forensic interviewers will work at a child protection center or child advocacy center. 
See, e.g., In re Rolandis G., 902 N.E.2d 600, 604 (Ill. 2008) (a child advocate at the Carrie 
Lynn Children’s Center, “a facility which provides services to child victims of sexual and 
severe physical abuse” interviewed the child victim), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2747 (2009); 
State v. Bentley, 739 N.W.2d 296, 297 (Iowa 2007) (a counselor at St. Luke’s Child Protec-
tion Center interviewed the child victim); State v. Justus, 205 S.W.3d 872, 876 (Mo. 2006) 
(a counselor and licensed social worker for the Northwest Missouri Children’s Advocacy 
Center interviewed the child victim); In re S.R., 920 A.2d 1262, 1264 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) 
(a forensic interview specialist employed by the Philadelphia Children’s Alliance inter-
viewed the child victim). This Note will generally adopt Professor Mosteller’s understand-
ing of trained questioners, although he uses the term “social worker” to refer to them. See 
Mosteller, supra note 27, at 966 (“The individual asking the questions is a trained ques-
tioner, a nurse or social services caseworker, which I will interchangeably term a social 
worker.”). 
136 See Bobadilla, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1111 (recognizing that a social worker’s interview 
serves “two important purposes: child protection and criminal investigation”); Mosteller, 
supra note 27, at 971 (noting that “social services caseworker[s’] professional interests 
include the health, physical placement, and safety of the child [which] clear[ly] overlap 
with the prosecutorial interest”); Cronch et al., supra note 109, at 196 (“[T]he purpose of 
the forensic interview is ‘to elicit as complete and accurate a report from the alleged child 
or adolescent victim as possible in order to determine whether the child or adolescent has 
been abused (or is in imminent risk of abuse) and, if so, by whom.’” (quoting the Ameri-
can Professional Society on the Abuse of Children)). 
137 See Bobadilla, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1101 (noting that the forensic interviewer used a 
technique that “instructs the interviewer to ask nonleading questions, to use terms chil-
dren would understand, and to progress quickly since young children have short attention 
spans”); Cross et al., supra note 133, at 1 (stating that Children’s Advocacy Centers em-
ploy forensic interviewers who are “specially trained to work with children”). 
138 See Cross et al., supra note 133, at 1 (stating that Children’s Advocacy Centers cor-
rect the problems of stress on child victims due to the investigatory process and untrained 
questioning). 
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cause of their training, forensic interviewers can minimize the trauma 
upon the child victims when they recount their abuse.139 Second, they 
are knowledgeable about the developmental issues that can complicate 
efforts to secure accurate information about the abuse.140 
 As a result, forensic interviews increase the reliability of a child vic-
tim’s out-of-court statements because they counter the main challenge 
of an inexperienced questioner.141 The forensic interviewer’s training in 
questioning children lessens the risk of misunderstanding and misinter-
pretation between the interviewer and the child victim.142 In addition, 
the use of particular interviewing techniques by forensic interviewers 
minimizes the possibility of suggestive and leading questioning.143 Lastly, 
a thorough forensic interview preserves the child victim’s fresh recollec-
tion of the abuse, thus resulting in more reliable statements.144 
2. Videotaped Interviews 
 Videotaping interviews with child sexual abuse victims also helps 
increase the reliability of their out-of-court statements.145 Videotapes 
capture the demeanor of the child victim during the interview, which 
allows a more accurate presentation of the child’s reactions to questions 
and their behavior while answering questions.146 They also provide as-
surances against suggestive and leading questioning because those view-
ing the videotape can observe how the interviewer questioned the 
child.147 
                                                                                                                      
139 See id. at 8 (finding that “children tended to report feeling less scared during [Chil-
dren’s Advocacy Center] interviews”); What Is Forensic Interviewing?, Child. Services Prac. 
Notes (N.C. Div. of Soc. Servs. & The Family & Child Res. Program) Dec. 2002, at 1, 2, 
available at http://ssw.unc.edu/fcrp/cspn/vol8_no1/cspn_v8no1.pdf. 
140 What Is Forensic Interviewing?, supra note 139, at 2. 
141 See Cross et al., supra note 133, at 1; Yuille et al., supra note 96, at 97–98, 111; 
What Is Forensic Interviewing?, supra note 139, at 2. 
142 See Yuille et al., supra note 96, at 97–98, 111; What Is Forensic Interviewing?, supra 
note 139, at 2. 
143 See Bobadilla, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1101; Yuille et al., supra note 96, at 97–98, 111; 
What Is Forensic Interviewing?, supra note 139, at 2. 
144 See What is Forensic Interviewing?, supra note 139, at 2–3. 
145 See Wright, 497 U.S. at 812–13; Myers, supra note 133, at 84–88; Cronch et al., supra 
note 109, at 197 (“[S]upervision is highly beneficial in reducing improper and clumsy 
interviewing. Interviews should be taped . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
146 Myers, supra note 133, at 85. 
147 See Wright, 497 U.S. at 812–13; Torres v. Warden, No. CV054000278S, 2008 WL 
2426600, at *4 n.1 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 28, 2008) (expert witness testified that the 
“‘documents and video reflect that there were a variety of problems with the way in which 
the victim in this case was interviewed, both by professionals and by her mother’”); Myers, 
supra note 133, at 85. 
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 Furthermore, videotapes have the added benefit of reducing 
trauma on the child victim by limiting the number of interviews.148 In-
stead of the child having to retell the account of the abuse multiple 
times to different agencies (law enforcement officials, health care pro-
viders, social workers, and prosecutors), the interview can be video-
taped and passed along to the different agencies.149 This encourages 
and facilitates inter-agency cooperation.150 
3. Confrontation Clause Implications Pre-Crawford 
 Under the Roberts rule of reliability, a child victim’s out-of-court 
statements were admissible at trial only if they fell under a “firmly rooted 
exception to the hearsay rule” or contained “particularized guarantees 
of reliability.”151 Using forensic interviewers and videotaping the inter-
views work primarily to ensure that these statements have those “particu-
larized guarantees of reliability” so that they are admissible at trial.152 As 
stated earlier, the Supreme Court noted in Wright that “certain proce-
dural safeguards” could help determine the trustworthiness of a child 
                                                                                                                      
148 See Bobadilla, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1110; Cross et al., supra note 133, at 2; Myers, su-
pra note 133, at 85; Mosteller, supra note 27, at 966; What Is Forensic Interviewing?, supra note 
140, at 2. In Bobadilla v. Carlson, the District Court noted the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
observation: 
Avoiding multiple interviews is a critical concern when dealing with children 
not only because the interviews are often traumatic for the child, but also be-
cause multiple interviews increase the chance that the children will be con-
fused by unnecessarily suggestive questions. . . . Given the clear need to limit 
a child’s exposure to stressful and confusing interviews, and the accompany-
ing need to accurately assess risks to the child, there is a compelling need for 
a single recorded assessment interview solely in order to best protect the 
health and welfare of the child. 
570 F. Supp. 2d at 1110 (quoting State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 255 (Minn. 2006)). 
The Cronch study on forensic interviewing techniques also reported that “[r]epeated in-
terviewing and repeatedly asking similar questions have both been associated with inaccu-
rate reporting and recanting allegations, particularly if early interviews are conducted 
inappropriately. Furthermore, the child’s suffering is exacerbated when they are repeat-
edly and unnecessarily subjected to stressful and upsetting interviews with multiple strang-
ers.” Cronch et al., supra note 109, at 203. 
149 See Rolandis, 902 N.E.2d at 604 (videotape of the interview conducted by a child ad-
vocate at a children’s center was given to police); Bentley, 739 N.W.2d at 300 (copy of video-
tape of interview conducted by child protection center counselor given to police accord-
ing to protocol); State v. Barnes, 149 Ohio Misc. 2d 1, 29 (Ct. Common Pleas 2008) (social 
worker testified that “videotapes of the interviews [with victims of sexual abuse] would be 
turned over to the police”); Mosteller, supra note 27, at 966. 
150 See Mosteller, supra note 27, at 966. 
151 See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
152 See Wright, 497 U.S. at 812–13. 
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victim’s out-of-court statements.153 In fact, the Supreme Court specifi-
cally stated that videotaping interviews could create circumstances un-
der which a court could find out-of-court statements reliable.154 
B. A Problem: Creating Inadmissible Testimonial Statements Post-Crawford 
 While forensic interviewers and videotaped interviews worked to 
increase the reliability of out-of-court statements made by child victims 
of sexual abuse, the testimonial standard of Crawford has essentially ren-
dered these statements inadmissible.155 In general, courts have evalu-
ated the circumstances surrounding the videotaped statements to foren-
sic interviewers and concluded that they fall into the definitional 
formulations of “testimonial” laid out in Crawford.156 
1. Forensic Interviewers 
 Despite the introduction of forensic interviewers as a means to in-
crease reliability, the very presence of forensic interviewers has led 
many lower courts to deem the resulting statements as testimonial.157 
                                                                                                                      
153 See id. at 818. 
154 See id. at 812–13. 
155 See, e.g., Bobadilla, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1107, 1112 (finding that the Minnesota Su-
preme Court was “unreasonable” in holding that the admission of a child victim’s video-
taped interview with a forensic interview was “not a ‘police interrogation’ within the mean-
ing of Crawford”); State v. Contreras, 979 So. 2d 896, 905, 911 (Fla. 2008) (finding that the 
Child Protection Team (CPT) interviewer’s videotaped interview with the child victim was 
testimonial and thus, its admission at trial violated the Confrontation Clause); Rolandis, 
902 N.E.2d at 611 (finding that a child advocate’s videotaped interview with a child victim 
was testimonial and that its was “improperly admitted” at trial); Bentley, 739 N.W.2d at 301–
02 (affirming the state district court’s ruling that the child protection center (CPC) coun-
selor’s videotaped interview with the child victim was testimonial, and thus violated the 
defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights when admitted at trial); Justus, 205 S.W.3d at 880–
81 (holding that a social worker’s videotaped interview with a child victim was testimonial 
and its admission at trial violated the Confrontation Clause). 
156 See, e.g., Bobadilla, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1107–09 (considering the time between when 
the abuse took place and when the interview was conducted, who initiated the interview, 
the location of the interview, and the forensic training of the social worker when deter-
mining whether the videotaped interview was testimonial); Contreras, 979 So. 2d at 905 
(considering the coordination between police and the child protection team, the influ-
ence the police had over the interview, and the presence of police at the interview in de-
termining whether the videotaped interview was testimonial); Rolandis, 902 N.E.2d at 611 
(considering who initiated the interview, the purpose of the interview, and the fact that 
the videotape was turned over to the police in determining whether the videotaped inter-
view was testimonial); Justus, 205 S.W.3d at 880–81 (holding that a social worker’s video-
taped interview with a child victim was testimonial and its admission at trial violated the 
Confrontation Clause). 
157 Mosteller, supra note 27, at 961. 
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For some courts, the term “forensic” automatically results in a finding 
of testimonial for the resulting statements.158 In these circumstances, 
the court relies on the definition of the word “forensic” to determine 
that the child victim’s out-of-court statements are testimonial under the 
formulations set forth in Crawford.159 Here, the term “forensic” implies 
a prosecutorial or trial use, and thus, falls under any of Crawford’s three 
formulations of “testimonial.”160 
 Other courts determine that forensic interviewers are government 
agents, and are thus, testimonial under Davis.161 Under the primary 
purpose test established in Davis, statements made to government offi-
cials are testimonial if the primary purpose of the interview was to es-
tablish past events as opposed to information being provided during an 
emergency.162 In these instances, courts often look to the circumstances 
in which the forensic interviews take place, find that there is no on-
going emergency, and conclude that the resulting statements are testi-
monial because they establish past events.163 Particularly, the courts 
look to how the forensic interviewers came to interview the child vic-
tim.164 In many cases, the police invite forensic interviews to question 
                                                                                                                      
158 See id. at 961 & n.157. 
159 See Mosteller, supra note 27, at 961 n.157; see also Hooper, 2006 WL 2328233, at *4 n.6 
(relying on the New Oxford American Dictionary for definitions of forensic). 
160 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52; Mosteller, supra note 27, at 961 n.157. 
161 See, e.g., Bobadilla, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1108–09 (finding that the social worker “was 
acting as a ‘surrogate interviewer’ for the police” and that the interview “appeared to be 
aimed toward one goal: getting [the child victim] to repeat, on videotape, his assertion 
that Bobadilla had abused him”); Contreras, 979 So. 2d at 905 (finding that “the CPT coor-
dinator was serving as a police proxy in this interview” and that “the primary, if not the 
sole, purpose of the CPT interview was to investigate whether the crime of child sexual 
abuse had occurred, and to establish facts potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecu-
tion”); Rolandis, 902 N.E.2d at 611 (holding that the social worker “was acting as a repre-
sentative of the police” and that “there is absolutely no indication that . . . [the social 
worker’s] interview of [the child victim] was conducted, to a substantial degree, for treat-
ment rather than investigative purposes”); Justus, 205 S.W.3d at 880 (finding that the social 
worker “was acting as a government agent” and that the “interview was performed to pre-
serve [the child victim’s] testimony for trial”). 
162 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). 
163 See, e.g., Henderson, 160 P.3d at 790–79 (finding that “[t]here was no emergency; 
[the child victim] was speaking of past events . . . ; her demeanor was calm”); Justus, 205 
S.W.3d at 880 (holding that the child victim’s videotaped statements “were not produced 
in the midst of an ‘on going emergency’” and that the child victim’s “demeanor in the 
videotaped interview was calm”). 
164 See, e.g., Bobadilla, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1108 (noting the testimony of the social worker 
who stated, “[the detective] from the Police Department asked me to assist him in inter-
viewing [the child victim]”); Rolandis, 902 N.E.2d at 611 (noting that “the interview took 
place at the behest of the police so that a more detailed account of the alleged sexual 
abuse could be obtained by a trained interviewer and memorialized on videotape”); Bent-
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the child.165 This police invitation often contributes to some courts’ 
findings that there is sufficient government involvement to support a 
decision that the resulting interview contains testimonial statements.166 
 Finally, some courts hold that the forensic interviews are them-
selves the functional equivalent of police interrogations and serve a law 
enforcement purpose.167 As a result, the statements obtained through 
forensic interviews are testimonial under the Crawford formulations and 
the Davis primary purpose test.168 
2. Videotaped Interviews 
 While videotaping interviews also helped to ensure the reliability of 
interviews with child victims, the very act of videotaping has led courts 
to find that the resulting statements are testimonial.169 Some lower 
                                                                                                                      
ley, 739 N.W.2d at 299 (noting that “[t]he police department’s standard operating proce-
dure calls for the referral of child victims of sexual abuse to the CPC for ‘forensic inter-
views’”). 
165 See, e.g., Bobadilla, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1108 (police detective invited social worker to 
interview child victim); Rolandis, 902 N.E.2d at 611 (interview with child advocate “took 
place at the behest of the police”); Bentley, 739 N.W.2d at 299 (“[t]he police department’s 
standard operating procedure calls for the referral of child victims of sexual abuse to the 
CPC for ‘forensic interviews’”). 
166 See, e.g., Bobadilla, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1112 (finding unreasonable the Minnesota Su-
preme Court’s holding that the videotape interview was not testimonial despite “that a 
recorded interview . . . was conducted at the request of a police detective”); Contreras, 979 
So. 2d at 905 (noting that “the CPT coordinator was serving as a police proxy in this inter-
view” when concluding that the child victim’s videotaped statements were testimonial); 
Rolandis, 902 N.E.2d at 611 (noting that the videotaped interview was “conducted on be-
half of the police” when holding that the child victim’s “videotaped statement was testimo-
nial in nature”). 
167 See, e.g., Bobadilla, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1110–11 (finding that “the social worker’s in-
terview of a child is expressly intended to substitute for a separate interrogation by the 
police” and that the purpose of the interview was both child protection and law enforce-
ment); Contreras, 979 So. 2d at 905 (noting that the “CPT coordinator was serving as a po-
lice proxy in this interview” and that “the primary, if not the sole, purpose of the CPT in-
terview was to investigate whether the crime of child sexual abuse had occurred, and to 
establish facts potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution”); Rolandis, 902 N.E.2d at 
611 (holding that the child advocate “was acting as a representative of the police” and that 
“there is no indication that . . . [the] interview . . . was conducted, to a substantial degree, 
for treatment rather than investigated purposes”); Justus, 205 S.W.3d at 880 (holding that 
the social worker “was acting as a government agent when she interviewed [the child vic-
tim]” and that “[w]hile there is no doubt that one purpose of the interrogations was to 
enable assistance to the child, the circumstances indicated that their primary purpose was 
to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution”). 
168 See, e.g., Bobadilla, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1112; Contreras, 979 So. 2d at 905; Rolandis, 902 
N.E.2d at 611; Justus, 205 S.W.3d at 880–81. 
169 See, e.g., Rolandis, 902 N.E.2d at 611; Bentley, 739 N.W.2d at 300; Henderson, 160 P.3d 
at 790. 
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courts find that videotaping interviews evinces a formality that over-
whelmingly points to the testimonial nature of the resulting state-
ments.170 In these cases, the formality of videotaping suggests future evi-
dentiary use, and as such, the court finds the videotape testimonial 
under Crawford.171 
 In addition, for some courts, the fact that the videotape can be 
shared between agencies is yet another reason to support a finding of 
“testimonial.”172 In many instances, the videotaped interview takes place 
at a child protection center, and the video is then passed onto the police 
and placed into evidence.173 While this share-ability originally served as 
a benefit to encourage inter-agency cooperation and reduce the poten-
tial trauma on the child victim by reducing the number of interviews, it 
now only heightens the risk that a court will find the child victim’s 
statements “testimonial” because of its potential evidentiary use.174 
                                                                                                                      
170 See, e.g., Bentley, 739 N.W.2d at 300, 301 (stating that the “video equipment that was 
used to make a record of the interview” contributed to an “indicia of ‘formality’ surround-
ing [the child victim’s] statements” and concluding that the videotaped interview was tes-
timonial); Henderson, 160 P.3d at 790, 794 (observing that “the interview was conducted in 
a formal setting with question and answer format and was recorded, with both video and 
audiotape,” which led to a conclusion that the videotaped statements were testimo-
nial)(citations omitted); see also Mosteller, supra note 27, at 961 (noting that “courts are 
concerned about the degree of ‘formality’ of the statement, which may also involve its 
recordation, often on videotape”). 
171 See, e.g., Bentley, 739 N.W.2d at 300, 302 (stating that the videotaping equipment 
contributed to an “indicia of ‘formality’ surrounding [the child victim’s] statements” and 
concluding that the videotaped interview was testimonial); Henderson, 160 P.3d at 790, 794 
(observing that “the interview was conducted in a formal setting, with question and answer 
format and was recorded, with both video and audiotape,” which led to a conclusion that 
the videotaped statements were testimonial)(citations omitted). 
172 See, e.g., Rolandis, 902 N.E.2d at 611 (observing that “because the interview [was] 
immediately turned over to [the police] ‘as evidence’ . . . the objective circumstances indi-
cate that . . . the videotaped evidence was testimonial”); Bentley, 739 N.W.2d at 300 (stating 
that because the videotaped interview was given to the police, the “factual circumstances 
make it objectively apparent that ‘the purpose of the [recorded interview] was to nail 
down the truth about past criminal events’”) (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 830). 
173 See, e.g., Rolandis, 902 N.E.2d at 604 (videotape of the interview conducted by a 
child advocate at a children’s center was given to police); Bentley, 739 N.W.2d at 299–300 
(copy of videotape of interview conducted by child protection center counselor given to 
police according to protocol); Barnes, 149 Ohio Misc. 2d at 29 (social worker testified that 
“videotapes of the interviews [with victims of sexual abuse] would be turned over to the 
police”). 
174 See, e.g., Bobadilla, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1110, 1112 (noting the benefits of videotaped 
interviews with child victims of sexual abuse, but still finding the videotape testimonial); 
Rolandis, 902 N.E.2d at 611 (also noting the benefits of videotaped interviews but finding 
the videotape testimonial); Bentley, 739 N.W.2d at 302 (likewise acknowledging the treat-
ment benefits of the interview circumstances, but ultimately concluding that the videotape 
was testimonial). 
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 Lastly, these videotaped statements often contain powerful “iden-
tity statements,” statements in which the child victim identifies his or 
her abuser.175 The fact that these statements are made even more reli-
able because they are videotaped only increases the courts’ scrutiny of 
the admissibility of these statements in order to prevent violations of 
defendants’ Sixth Amendment constitutional rights.176 
3. Confrontation Clause Implications Post-Crawford 
 Overall, the attempts to increase the reliability of out-of-court 
statements by child victims in order to assure their admissibility at trial 
under Roberts has essentially provided lower courts with more leverage 
to find the statements inadmissible under Crawford’s testimonial stan-
dard.177 While the use of forensic interviewers and video recording di-
rectly addressed the evidentiary concerns that prosecutors face regard-
ing the reliability of child witnesses and jury expectations, these 
improvements are minimally beneficial if the statements remain inad-
                                                                                                                      
175 See, e.g., Bobadilla, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1101; Henderson, 160 P.3d at 779; Justus, 205 
S.W.3d at 876. For example, in Bobadilla, the following exchange occurred between the 
child protection worker (CPW) and the child victim (T.B.), where the child victim ulti-
mately identified the defendant as her abuser: 
CPW: [H]as anyone hurt your body? 
T.B.: Mmm, MmmMmm (affirmative) 
CPW: Yeah. Who hurt your body? 
T.B.: Orlando did. 
570 F. Supp. 2d at 1101 (footnote omitted). Likewise, in State v. Henderson, the following 
exchange took place between the social worker (LC) and the child victim (FI), and again, 
the child victim identified the defendant as her abuser: 
LC: A body, you’re right. That’s what you said. It’s a body and that nobody is 
supposed to touch us on our body. Did you know that? 
FI: Tae touched my body and it was hurting. 
LC: He did? 
FI: With the ding ding. 
LC: With the ding ding? 
FI: Uh huh (positive). 
160 P.3d at 779. 
176 See Mosteller, supra note 27, at 996 (“Where the interview is mechanically recorded, 
its formality and enormous utility for use at trial should cause courts to presume the state-
ment’s testimonial character absent clear evidence of a substantial independent pur-
pose.”). 
177 See, e.g., Bobadilla, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1110–11; Contreras, 979 So. 2d at 905; Rolandis, 
902 N.E.2d at 611; Bentley, 739 N.W.2d at 300; Henderson, 160 P.3d at 789–93; Justus, 205 
S.W.3d at 880. 
98 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 30:67 
missible at trial.178 Thus, in practice, Crawford does very little to help the 
prosecution of child sexual abuse; instead, it often stands directly in the 
way of prosecuting one of the least prosecuted crimes in the nation.179 
                                                                                                                      
178 See, e.g., Bobadilla, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1110; Rolandis, 902 N.E.2d at 611; Bentley, 739 
N.W.2d at 302. In Bobadilla, the District Court for the District of Minnesota criticized the 
observations of the Minnesota Supreme Court, stating: 
The problem with [the Minnesota Supreme Court’s] explanation is that it 
skips over the reason why making a videotape of the assessment interview pro-
tects “the health and welfare of the child.” It protects the child by minimizing 
the chances that the child will have to be interviewed a second time, and it 
minimizes the chances that the child will have to be interviewed a second 
time by giving law enforcement officers a recorded statement for use in their 
investigation. 
570 F. Supp. 2d at 1110. In this way, the District Court asserts that the reason why a single 
recorded interview protects the “health and welfare of the child” is not by virtue of the fact 
that there is only one interview, but rather, because the single recorded interview produces 
an interview that is beneficial to law enforcement. See id. Consequently, the District Court 
ruled that the Minnesota Supreme Court was unreasonable in concluding that the video-
taped interview was not testimonial. Id. at 1112. Furthermore, in Rolandis, the Supreme 
Court of Illinois recognized that “the purpose of this type of interdisciplinary, collaborative 
protocol is to ‘minimize the stress created for the child and his or her family by the inves-
tigatory and judicial process, and to ensure that more effective treatment is provided for 
the child and his or her family.’” 902 N.E.2d at 611 (quoting Ill. Comp. Stat. 80/3(d) 
(2008)). However, the court still found the videotaped statements testimonial and thus, 
improperly admitted at trial. Id. In Bentley, the Supreme Court of Iowa stated: 
We credit the State’s assertion that the CPC performs very important and 
laudable services in furtherance of the protection of children. . . . It is beyond 
dispute that information gathered from [the child victim] in such a child-
friendly, safe environment could have been very useful in the treatment of 
her well-documented psychological conditions. 
739 N.W.2d at 302. Nevertheless, the court still held: 
The actors were doing important work intended to investigate past alleged 
crimes and prevent future crimes. Although one of the significant purposes of 
the interrogation was surely to protect and advance the treatment of [the 
child victim] . . . , the extensive involvement of the police in the interview 
rendered [the child victim’s] statements testimonial. 
Id. 
179 See, e.g., Bobadilla, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1113 (in finding the videotape interview testi-
monial, the court granted petitioner’s habeas corpus petition, vacated his conviction, and 
ordered his release); Contreras, 979 So. 2d at 911–12 (in finding the videotaped interview 
testimonial, the court found the trial court’s error not harmless in regards to the defen-
dant’s capital sexual battery conviction); Henderson, 160 P.3d at 794 (affirming the appeals 
court’s finding that the videotaped interview was testimonial and reversal of conviction); 
Justus, 205 S.W.3d at 881 (in holding that the circuit court “erred in admitting the video-
taped interview,” the court reversed the judgment and remanded the case). In some cases, 
however, the court will find that despite the use of testimonial statements at trial in viola-
tion of the Confrontation Clause, the admission constituted harmless error and the court 
will uphold the defendant’s conviction. See Rolandis, 902 N.E.2d at 619. In other cases, 
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IV. A Limited Solution 
 A brief examination of case law in the area of child abuse prosecu-
tion reveals that prosecutors rely heavily on the out-of-court statements 
of child victims when the child victims are unavailable to testify.180 
While forensic interviewers and videotaping work to address health and 
policy concerns regarding the investigation of child abuse claims, these 
efforts have generally ensured that the resulting out-of-court statements 
are inadmissible at trial despite claims that the interviews serve health 
and treatment purposes in addition to law enforcement objectives.181 A 
simple solution may be to encourage courts to look at videotaped in-
terviews in “minute and separate assertions” when determining the 
primary purpose of the statement.182 
 Currently, courts appear to admit videotapes of forensic interviews 
in their entirety.183 This approach fails to consider that videotaped fo-
rensic interviews often encompass multiple purposes, suggesting that 
testimonial and non-testimonial statements could be dispersed 
throughout a single interview.184 Adoption of the “minute and separate” 
approach would allow a court to closely examine a videotaped interview 
for testimonial statements and exclude only those statements.185 
                                                                                                                      
there still may be sufficient evidence for a retrial. See Bobadilla, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1113; 
Henderson, 160 P.3d at 782, 794. 
180 See, e.g., Bobadilla v. Carlson, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1101 (D. Minn. 2008) (videotaped 
interview admitted into evidence when judge found child victim not competent to testify); In 
re Rolandis G., 902 N.E.2d 600, 603–04 (Ill. 2008) (videotaped interview played at trial when 
child victim refused to respond to question), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2747 (2009); State v. Hen-
derson, 160 P.3d 776, 781 (Kan. 2007)(judge determined that child victim was unavailable to 
testify and the child victim’s videotaped interview was played at trial). 
181 See, e.g., Bobadilla, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1110 (recognizing the benefits of videotaped 
forensic interviews but still finding them testimonial); Rolandis, 902 N.E.2d at 611 (recog-
nizing the benefits of videotaped forensic interviews but still finding them testimonial); 
State v. Bentley, 739 N.W.2d 296, 302 (Iowa 2007) (recognizing the benefits of videotaped 
forensic interviews but still finding them testimonial). 
182 Mosteller, supra note 27, at 956 n.132. 
183 See, e.g., State v. Hooper, No. 31025, 2006 WL 2328233, at *1 (Idaho Ct. App. Aug. 
11, 2006) (child victim was “too frightened to take the oath or testify” so the “trial court 
admitted the videotaped interview in lieu of her live testimony”); Rolandis, 902 N.E.2d at 
604 (“videotape was played in its entirety for the court”); State v. Justus, 205 S.W.3d 872, 
877 (Mo. 2006) (“the videotape was played for the jury”); State v. Arnold, No. 07AP-789, 
2008 WL 2698885, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. July 10, 2008) (“trial court ruled that the victim 
was unavailable to testify” and “allowed the State to present, in lieu of the victim’s live tes-
timony, her recorded interview from the Child and Family Advocacy Center”). 
184 See Mosteller, supra note 27, at 955–56, 956 n.132. 
185 See id. at 956 n.132. 
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 In fact, this approach is suggested in Davis.186 In Davis, the Court 
encouraged trial courts to “redact or exclude the portions of any state-
ment that have become testimonial.”187 Furthermore, courts are accus-
tomed to performing this type of fact-intensive inquiry.188 For instance, 
when determining whether a statement is against interest, the Supreme 
Court held in United States v. Williamson that courts cannot assume that 
a statement is self-inculpatory just because it falls within a greater con-
fession.189 Instead, the Court found that “[w]hether a statement is in 
fact against interest must be determined from the circumstances of 
each case.”190 This type of analysis is exactly the approach being en-
couraged here. 
 This approach, however, does leave one obstacle of how to address 
the powerful “identity statements” that are often found within these 
videotaped interviews with forensic interviewers.191 Luckily, prosecutors 
may have to address this issue in very limited circumstances where the 
videotaped interview is the only evidence suggesting the accused’s in-
volvement in the alleged abuse.192 In the majority of cases, courts find a 
                                                                                                                      
186 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 829 (2006). 
187 Id. 
188 See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 599–602 (1994) (suggesting a minute 
and separate approach to determining whether statements made within a confession are 
statements against interest); Mosteller, supra note 27, at 956 n.132. 
189 Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600–01. The Court stated: 
In our view, the most faithful reading of Rule 804(b)(3) is that it does not al-
low admission of non-self-inculpatory statements, even if they are made within 
a broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory. The district court may 
not just assume for purposes of Rule 804(b)(3) that a statement is self-
inculpatory because it is part of a fuller confession, and this is especially true 
when the statement implicates someone else. 
Id. 
190 Id. at 601. 
191 Bobadilla, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1101 (Child victim identified the defendant as his 
abuser in the course of a forensic interview.); Henderson, 160 P.3d at 779 (Child victim 
identified the defendant as his abuser in the course of a forensic interview.); Justus, 205 
S.W.3d at 876 (Child victim identified the defendant as his or her abuser in the course of a 
forensic interview.). This problem has arisen in instances regarding a child victim’s state-
ments to medical treatment personnel. See Mosteller, supra note 27, at 950–51, 950 n.115. 
Some courts have found that the accusatory nature of identity statements demands a find-
ing of testimonial although, generally, statements to medical treatment personnel are not 
considered testimonial. See id. at 950–51. 
192 There is a lack of case law in which a videotaped interview with a forensic inter-
viewer is the only inculpatory evidence probably because initial disclosures are “usually to a 
family member or friend, and virtually never to authorities.” See Davis Amicus Brief, supra 
note 95, at 8. Thus, the prosecutor has the child victim’s out-of-court statements to family 
members as evidence in addition to the videotaped interview. See, e.g., Rolandis, 902 N.E.2d 
at 603–04 (child victim’s mother testified at trial as to the child victim’s disclosure to her); 
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child victim’s identity statements to a family member or nurse or doctor 
non-testimonial, and thus, admissible at trial.193 As a result, even if 
courts exclude a child victim’s videotaped identity statement, there still 
may be sufficient evidence to support a conviction.194 
Conclusion 
 The adoption of a “minute and separate” approach by the courts 
could lessen Crawford’s impact on the prosecution of child sexual 
abuse. A “minute and separate” approach to determining whether a 
child victim’s statements in a videotaped interview with a forensic inter-
viewer are testimonial will better address the medical and prosecutorial 
concerns that these interview protocols were developed to address. 
This approach would take advantage of the developments in child sex-
ual abuse investigations without fully forestalling the prosecution of this 
abhorrent crime. While the impact of the suggested solution would be 
minimal in scope, this suggestion would work to better balance the de-
sire to adequately prosecute child sexual abuse with the accused’s Con-
frontation Clause rights in a post-Crawford world. 
                                                                                                                      
Henderson, 160 P.3d at 781 (child victim’s mother testified at trial as to the child victim’s 
disclosure); Justus, 205 S.W.3d at 875–76 (child victim’s mother and grandmother testified 
at trial as to the child victim’s disclosures to them). 
193 See Mosteller, supra note 27, at 950. Professor Mosteller writes, “[w]ith only highly 
infrequent exceptions, statements by children to parents, family members, and friends are 
treated as nontestimonial. . . . Even if the child’s statement is strongly accusatory, the out-
come is generally the same.” Id. at 944–45. Likewise, Professor Mosteller states, “statements 
of children to doctors and nurses who are the first to examine the child after the report of 
assault are almost universally treated as nontestimonial.” Id. at 950. He notes, however, that 
some courts have treated “the specific identity of the perpetrator” with exception, finding 
that “the part of the child’s statement that names the perpetrator as testimonial based on 
its accusatory nature.” Id. at 950–51. 
194 See, e.g., Bobadilla, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1110 (noting that the prosecution offered 
other evidence of Bobadilla’s guilt, granted his habeas corpus petition, but ordered the 
state to “take[] affirmative steps to reinstate a criminal prosecution of petitioner within 
sixty days,” suggesting a belief that there is sufficient evidence without the videotaped in-
terview to prosecute); Rolandis, 902 N.E.2d at 619 (stating that “the error in admitting [the 
videotaped interview] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the properly ad-
mitted evidence overwhelmingly supports respondent’s conviction”); Henderson, 160 P.3d 
at 794 (holding that after “[r]eviewing all of the remaining evidence, . . . a rational fact-
finder could have found Henderson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt”). 
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